On a recent reply to a post on John Crow’s blog concerning values, “Keith418” posted this:

Where do values like this come from? Many of us suspect a transcendent origin for certain values.

“The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value — and if there were, it would be of no value.

“If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental.

“What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in; the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental.

“It must lie outside the world.”

– Ludwig Wittgenstein, from Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

This may be one reason why humanism reveals itself to be utterly nihilistic – it cannot posit real values because it denies a transcendent source for values and has cut itself off from the place that these real values must originate. In addition, we can see why the people trying to separate Thelema from magick and transcendental magical work are also doomed to fail – because they eliminate, from the start, the very place people need to go to find the values they will bring into reality in the very struggle Schmitt describes.

This piece of astonishingly inept reasoning highlights exactly the kind of way in which belief can prevent the kind of “critical thinking” that, in this case, the believer strongly advocates.

To illustrate, let’s assume Wittgenstein’s argument is valid. Keith418’s “argument” goes like this:

1. “If there is a value which is of value, [the source of that value] must lie outside … the world”;
2. Therefore values must arise from outside the world;
3. Therefore there is a transcendental realm;
4. Therefore anyone who denies the existence of a transcendental realm is stupid.

This is the exactly the same kind of error Kant made with his analysis of morality. Kant’s “categorical imperative” essentially argued that “real morals” must have universal applicability, and from this argument he proceeded to develop his analysis. He developed some principles which he believed were of universal applicability, and accordingly reasoned “therefore this is the true morality.”

Neither Kant nor “Keith418” appear able to see the enormous logical gap staring them in the face. Kant’s argument from “real morals must have universal applicability” to “this is the true morality” completely misses a crucial alternative: there are no morals having universal applicability, therefore there are no real morals. The argument simply cannot be completed without considering this alternative. Similarly, “Keith418″‘s argument goes “real values must arise from the transcendent, therefore the transcendent exists and we have to explore it to find the real values,” completely missing the alternative that if real values must arise from the transcendent and the transcendent doesn’t exist then “real values” don’t exist either. Both Kant and “Keith418” are taking a gigantic leap of faith when they assume that real morals and real values, respectively, exist.

“Keith418” criticises humanism because it has “cut itself off from the place that these real values must originate,” illustrating the leap of faith he has made that:

1. “Real values” exist; and
2. They must originate from the transcendental.

It is a classic example of incorrectly believing the universe to work in the way one wants it to.

The blindness this kind of belief engenders is easily visible. “Keith418” really uses this argument to convince himself that the “transcendental” exists, because he really wants it to exist, and for his silly ceremonial nonsense to have some kind of sensible basis; he really, desperately wants the universe to be that way, and simply will not accept the possibility of the alternative. As a result, he is blind to not only the logical errors he is making, but also to the logical errors Wittgenstein is making. He has deliberately closed down his own faculties of “critical thinking” that he so vigorously encourages others to employ.

Let’s assume that Wittgenstein is correct, that “real values” must originate outside the world because if they did, they would be “accidental” and therefore not “real”. So let’s assume those values originate in the transcendental. Now, let’s look at the values in the transcendental. Where do they originate from? If they originate from the transcendental, then they are accidental in exactly the same way as they would be if they originated in the world. So, in fact, not only must they originate outside of the world, but they must also originate outside of the transcendental, too. And so on into infinite regress. It’s the same kind of stupid argument that believes the theory of a divine creator is sensible because the world must have had a “first cause”, whilst completely ignoring the fact that their theory completely ignores the fact that their creator doesn’t seem to have a “first cause” himself.

“Keith418″‘s comment is a good example of the crippling effect belief has on the reasoning faculty, how the intrusion of belief into a logical argument completely throws it off into Lalaland, resulting in the arguer drawing some incredibly stupid conclusions, including – in this case – the conclusion that Thelema must be somehow concerned with Wittgenstein’s “real values.”