At the heart of Thelema is the concept of “will,” or “True Will” as it is sometimes called, the idea that there is a course of action most “proper” or most “natural” to each individual, and that his happiness, satisfaction, fulfillment, actualisation – call it what you will – is maximised by whole-heartedly following such a course of action. At the heart of most types of pagan or neo-pagan philosophies is the idea that one should live “in harmony with nature,” each element fulfilling its proper function whilst trusting in the equilibrium of nature – which we now know to have been established through a long and reductive process of evolution, eliminating those organisms that are unable to survive in this equilibrium – to provide for all thereby. The essential identity between these two ideas should be clear; if the “nature” of an organism has developed in order to facilitate survival in the environment as a whole (or, more accurately, those organisms whose nature is not so conducive have been eliminated) then acting in accordance with the nature of the individual organism equates to acting in harmony with nature itself. This approach can be contrasted with other “religious” views (such as Christianity and Buddhism, which treat nature as “sin” in the former case, and “suffering” in the latter) as well as secular philosophies (such as humanism, which seeks to elevate some elements of nature above others in pursuit of a manufactured social ideal) which view nature as something to be overcome in some way, rather than as something to acquiesce in.

One question that is sometimes raised in the investigation of the “nature-based” idea is this: if everything has arisen from “natural” processes (which we must assume to be true – even “man-made” objects have been made as a result of natural processes, i.e. the process of the development of organisms with an ability to make such objects – unless we wish to posit the strange idea of a creator-god who has created nature but is apart from it, and even then we would have to ask why such a pre-existing god should not be considered to be “part of nature”) then how is it possible to act in a way contrary to nature? From an environmentalist perspective which is often encountered with neo-pagans in particular, we might ask how, for instance, the widespread destruction of forests could be considered to be “against nature,” if such acts are carried out by human beings whose instincts, desires and thoughts have arisen through a process of natural development. On a more strictly Thelemic side, we may ask how one could ever not act “in accordance with will” if their actions arise as a result of the conjunction between themselves (which have arisen naturally), others (who have also arisen naturally) and their environment (which can be called “nature” itself).

For this idea to make any sense at all, we have to assume that there is some significant input to the decision making process which can sensibly be described as “not natural,” or the approach in its entirety becomes groundless. To look for such an input, we have to consider more carefully what is meant by “natural.”

To take a simple example, we may consider the case of a wild animal, and we may reasonably say that “it is the nature of the animal to eat when it is hungry.” If it were to become hungry in a place where no food was to be found, then we might argue that it was being compelled to “act unnaturally” by the absence of food forcing it not to eat when it was hungry. Of course, we would expect the animal to seek out food in such a case, and we could just as easily say that “it is the nature of the animal to seek out food when it is hungry and no food is available” and we’re back to the animal acting naturally again.

Similarly, we might reasonably say that “it is the nature of the animal to avoid being eaten by lions,” and argue that when a lion does eat it – or attempt to – then it is being forced to “act unnaturally.” However, in the same vein, if we focus on what the animal actually does – i.e. tries to avoid being eaten – then we can say that by running away from the pursuing lion it is acting naturally.

In the case of man, we may take as an example a hypothetical situation of a man who has a deep-seated desire to work with animals, but due to considerations of worldly opulence and financial stability, whose importance has been pressed upon him by others, he decides to opt for a career as a lawyer instead, and accordingly becomes miserable. We may say that these considerations have compelled him to “act unnaturally” in suppressing his true desire, but why should we not say that it is natural for him to take these considerations into account, especially since we have observed him actually doing that?

To begin to examine this, we may return to the example of our wild animal. We may remark, for instance, that it is “natural” for its claws to grow. However, if those claws grow too long, then they begin to impede his motion and his actions. Therefore we observe the cat, for instance, scratching against its post in order to shorten its claws to its benefit. We appear to have one natural process frustrating another natural process. On first glance, this kind of phenonemon may lead us to conclude that it is impossible to ever fully “act naturally,” if we have to frustrate natural processes in order to do so. However, a little thought will reveal that whilst it is the nature of the cat’s nails to grow as long as they can, it is not in the nature of the cat to tolerate excessively long nails.

This conclusion should not be surprising. However we may word the nature of the gazelle, we can at least agree that it is not its nature to let itself get eaten, yet it is the nature of the lion to eat it. The natures of different organisms conflict all the time, and when we consider the environment as a whole to have a “nature” we can see that this conflict is in fact the entire basis of evolution in the first place. From a Thelemic perspective, we say only that the individual should act in accordance with his own nature, and if that should conflict with some other part of nature, then so be it. This appears to contradict our earlier statement that “acting in accordance with the nature of the individual organism equates to acting in harmony with nature itself,” but it in fact does not. Since we said that “conflict is in fact the entire basis of evolution” we can observe that conflict between organisms – or conflict between an organism and its environment – is indeed “in harmony with nature itself,” even if that conflict results in the thwarting of the nature of one of the individual organisms party to it. That is, conflict itself is natural (as even a cursory glance at the natural world will confirm) and therefore it is also natural that on many occasions an individual organism will find itself unable to act in accordance with its nature.

We can therefore now see that although “everything that happens is natural,” it does not follow that everything a man does must be in accordance with his own nature. But does it follow that everything a man does of his own “free will” must be in accordance with his own nature, since he himself is deigning those actions?

The answer depends on where we draw the boundaries of the “self,” and the nature of precisely what we consider to be “our” nature. In the case of our hypothetical feline, we had little difficulty accepting the idea that its claws were not a part of its “self,” and accordingly had little difficulty with the idea that shortening its own claws was not an act in contradiction to its own nature, to the nature of that “self.” If we return to the example of our hapless lawyer, then the situation becomes a little more complicated.

Most people will have little difficulty accepting the idea that claws, hair, skin and even entire limbs are not “part of the self,” since they can be removed and the self remains undiminished, even if the body is. The Thelemic approach states that the mind is also not “part of the self,” and it is this observation that shines some light on our example. If we assume that the mind, operating in accordance with its nature, can influence the self into acting in a manner not in accordance with the self’s own nature, then we can understand how something freely chosen can be in contradiction to the nature of the self, and hence in contradiction to the will.

As is discussed in True Will, defining this idea of “mind” is far from simple, and probably impossible in our current state of knowledge. Clearly it makes little sense to equate “mind” with the entirety of consciousness, since without consciousness at all it becomes meaningless to speak in terms of a “self.” However, it is not necessary to arrive at any such exact definition; we need only observe that there is at least a part of consciousness (i.e. the “thinking” part) that is separate from, and can influence, the remainder of consciousness (i.e. the “experiencing” or “aware” part). Whether these two concepts are wholly separate, or are merely parts of the same object, is immaterial to our purposes.

This “thinking part,” which we arbitrarily label “mind” as distinct from “self,” will be seen to be the primary obstacle to will. Regardless of the external circumstances, there is some form of action which will constitute “will”; if the individual is imprisoned, his will might be to escape, or to behave himself to better secure an early release; if he is physically attacked, his will might be to run, or to defend himself. If will is – to simplify slightly – an individual’s “natural course of action,” then there is just such a natural course for any given set of circumstances he finds himself in. It would therefore appear to be impossible for the will of an individual to be restricted by an external force, for provided that he is able to both discern his will and to carry it out, he can do so in any situation. However, if his own self is influenced in action from “within,” then he can be restricted. Not only that, but it is possible for another to restrict his will if that other is able to his individual’s mind in such a way that its influence on his self is turned to the other’s advantage. But, in both cases, it is the individual’s own mind which is the tool and the cause of restriction. The mind is therefore the “Great Enemy” as some have described it.

With this observation, we can suggest that if the self will in any cases naturally incline towards its own will (which it will by definition), then the essence of the task of discovering and carrying out the will is one of reducing the resistance that the self encounters from its own mind. One must seek the “path of least resistance” so that the mind does not influence the actions of the self in any direction. This is the meaning behind the injunction to “Bind nothing!” in The Book of the Law, as well as the source of the statement that “pure will, unassuaged of purpose, delivered from the lust of result, is every way perfect” in AL I, 44, since both purpose and “lust of result” are superimposed on natural action by the thinking mind. Furthermore, it is the rationale behind AL II, 29-31:

May Because be accursèd for ever!
If Will stops and cries Why, invoking Because, then Will stops & does nought.
If Power asks why, then is Power weakness.

If “Will stops and cries Why,” it is the thinking mind that is doing the crying; if “Power asks why,” it is the thinking mind that is doing the asking. In both cases, the thinking mind is getting in the way of the exercise of the preferences of the self; the self is allowing “itself” to be governed by its tool.

Therefore as the Sun progresses through the succedent decan of Pisces, and the vernal equinox – the point at which light begins to dominate darkness – is just three weeks away, take time to reflect that the mind is playing tricks, luring the self with thoughts of false promises, confusing it with false representations of the world, and that the self needs to realise that its own interests can trump those of its mind and it needs to assert control over its mind before it can come to liberty. The self must press its mind into service instead of being led by it if it is to achieve freedom and come into its own; it must recognise that its own preferences, and the preferences of its mind, are divergent, and it must not be afraid to assert its final authority.